NZ+Society

=Kia ora Welcome to= =New Zealand Society=

back to unit 10314 BICULTURALISM exists as a civics.

The binding document in New Zealand isThe Treaty of Waitangi. From this stem all civic understandings. Treaty of Waitangi **Ethnic and cultural identity** This process of adjusting to a new culture is called acculturation, and includes adjusting your behavior to meet the expectations of your new environment. Many will become bicultural. Being bicultural means the ability to function in more than one culture; usually the dominant culture and the culture of your heritage. People who are bicultural often describe it as the ability to switch between two worlds.
 * BICULTURAL COMMITMENT**

bicultural commitments to Mäori as tangata whenua.
http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/the-new-zealanders/page-12 New Zealand may have taken longer than most to reflect the world-wide increase in socio-demographic diversity within nation-states – the result, in turn, of a postcolonial history dominated by migration from Britain and other English-speaking countries (see Fleras and Spoonley, 1999; Pearson, 2000) – but it is now broadly typical of most other nation-states in this respect, particularly other ex-colonial white settler colonies such as the USA, Canada, and Australia.

Gramsci argues, in order to understand any nation-state as a whole, one must always distinguish between its ‘State’ or political and administrative structure, and its ‘civil society’. The latter comprises, for example, its principal non-political organizations, its religious and other beliefs, and its specific ‘customs’ or way of life. In making these distinctions, there are inevitably features which do not fit easily under either category. However, as Nairn summarizes its: ‘that is relatively unimportant. What matters is that they are distinguishable, and that the singular identity of a modern society depends upon the relationship between them’ (1981: 131). We are a Bi-cultural nation with Multi-cultural realities. See extended reading below)



Samantha White points out the fallacy of democracy.

Here is a current day ( 2015) article to explain flaws in continuing race relations left unchallenged. This speaker in this article arrived from England to the Te Arawa area( Rotorua) in 2007 eight years ago to settle.

==== Tēnā koutou katoa, ngā mihi nui ki nga tupuna hoki. Ko Samantha White toku ingao, i whanau mai ahau I ingarangi, he uri ahau no te iwi hurai me te iwi airihi, engari, kei te rohe o Te Arawa toku kainga inaianei. ====

**Greetings to you all, acknowledgments to those who have gone before us also, I was born in England but now my home is in the region of Te Arawa.** **She continues:** James Baldwin in the 2012 Consedine book said: “the biggest problem with white privilege is the invisibility it maintains to those who benefit from it the most.” And the book goes on to say: In New Zealand white privilege evolved in colonial times where structures were put in place that were designed to meet the needs of Pākehā settlers… [and] marginalised Māori, yet these systematic structural benefits remain invisible to Pākehā.”

read more here.

[]

see more on tangatawhenua

back to unit 10314 New Zealand is a [|constitutional monarchy] with a [|parliamentary] system of government. This system is often known as the //[|Westminster system]//. The [|head of state] and notional source of executive, judicial and legislative power in New Zealand is the [|monarch], currently [|Queen Elizabeth II]. [|The Queen] is represented in the [|Realm of New Zealand] by a [|Governor-General]. = =

=Government Departments= http://www.indexnz.com/Top/Government/Government-Departments/ NEWS A first private prison is to be built in New Zealand

http://www.treasury.govt.nz/releases/2010-04-14

GOVERNMENT FILMS were produced from 1948 until 1974
http://www.nzonscreen.com/person/ramai-hayward Q. Does society link to nationalism? Is this still a viewpoint?

Here are two topical views

 British Nationalism: A Love That Dares Not Speak Its Own Name

There is a possibility that the 7 May 2015 General Election will be the last such UK election that includes Scotland. Imagine the (unlikely) scenario that a triumphant SNP vote elects all 59 Scottish MPs, giving a very … Huffington Post UK · 1 day ago  Divided we stand: Nationalism on march across Europe

Aurelien Mondon is a lecturer in French and Comparative Politics at University of Bath. The views expressed in this email are entirely those of the author. CNN is showcasing the work of The Conversation, a collaboration … ---  =The generations.=

A generation is defined as fifteen years. 2010 is the beginning of generation Alpha. Before Z was Y and before Y, X etc Now we have a generation A. One point to make is this is that Alpha the Millennial generation.   __** feeling a sense of national identity **__

<span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #404040; display: block; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">See Sam Neil's view of GALLIPOLI as a place of NATIONAL memorial here This is a 1.2 hour film commissioned for the 100 years of GALLIPOLI <span class="sn_snip" style="color: #333333;"> <span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #404040; display: block; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;"> <span style="color: #404040; font-family: 'Arial Black',Gadget,sans-serif; font-size: 140%;">and see more about context here
 * http://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/cultural-identity/**

See the Indicators in the Cultural report below
Three indicators are used in this report. They are local content programming on New Zealand television, people identifying as Māori who can speak in Māori, and the retention of their first language (other than English and Māori) by identified ethnic groups.

While these indicators cannot provide an exhaustive picture of New Zealand’s cultural identity, they do provide snapshots of the health of particular aspects of it. There is a strong focus on the health of Māori culture.

The first indicator, the amount of New Zealand content programming on television, provides one way of measuring the strength of New Zealanders’ sense of national identity.

The second indicator measures the current health of the Māori language. Language is a central component of culture and a necessary skill for full participation in Māori society.

The final indicator, the proportion of people who can speak the first language (other than English and Māori) of their ethnic group, is an indicator of the degree to which people are able to retain their culture and traditions and to pass them on to subsequent generations.

http://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/2009/cultural-identity/index.html

= = <span style="color: #d00606; font-family: 'Arial Black',Gadget,sans-serif; font-size: 23px;">go back to unit 10314 Cultural languages are part of evolutionary threat. Two languages( linguistically speaking ) are lost every day Who are the people? See Tangata whenua - Maori. Language Te Reo. See European. Languages. English. French. Dutch. Italian. German.

New Zealand is not strongly, yet, a pluralist society. What are our languages? Example. At Hagley college census in 2009,18 languages were spoken on the campus

//WHALE RIDER TRAILER DEFINES A RE-EMERGENCE OF PRIDE IN TE REO AND MAORITANGA// //Produced by John Barnett. Directed by Nici Caro// media type="youtube" key="-2IW9Cr0lWs" height="344" width="425"

Social trend forecasting( Australia) The current school generation is generation Y just coming to an end. 2010 is the start for generation Alpha. Generation Alpha will be the most formally-educated generation in history – http://www.mccrindle.com.au/snapshots/TOP-10-TRENDS-OF-THE-NEW-DECADE-2010-2020-McCrindle.pdf

we may be dominated by media New Zealand may ony be known in the world for: Sir Peter Jackson America's cup yacht racing Olympic champions Ernest Rutherford Archie Mcindoe * Sir Edmund Hilary See this list from kids at the Christchurch Library http://christchurchcitylibraries.com/kids/famousnewzealanders/

<span style="display: block; font-family: 'Arial Black',Gadget,sans-serif; font-size: 80%; text-align: center;">Read this power point from Auckland University 2007 We live as a democracy under constitutional laws.

More reading:

<span style="font-family: 'Arial Black',Gadget,sans-serif; font-size: 60%;">essay below on the skepticism towards multiculturalism = = - Critical comment

Denis Dutton was a professor in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand
1. April 2004. Los Angeles Times <span style="font-family: 'Arial Black',Gadget,sans-serif; font-size: 130%;">New Zealanders who engage in smug moralizing <span style="font-family: 'Arial Black',Gadget,sans-serif; font-size: 130%;">Our self congratulatory idealism
 * Excerpt. **
 * The world has an awkward way of coming up with surprises.  In the face of these deep uncertainties, Australia has decided to throw in its lot with the most powerful country the planet has ever seen. Both Australia and the United States are brash, spirited nations, natural allies in democratic politics, Anglo-Saxon heritage and lively temperament. These buoyant, optimistic peoples love freedom and will fight to protect it.  It is unworthy for the New Zealand Prime Minister to rubbish the Australian decision as a cynical ploy to attain a trade advantage. It's as contemptible as suggesting that the Americans are in Iraq for the oil. The Americans, in case no one has noticed, have begun a long-term war against terrorists, mainly Islamo-fascists, and their potential helpers among rogue states capable of producing enriched uranium or other devices and materials for mass murder.  The ultimate aim is to make sure that no one ever sails into New York harbour with a nuclear bomb packed into a shipping container.  Anyone who thinks this is an unreasonable fear on the part of the Americans is living in the same fantasy land as our Prime Minister. It was she who said before September 11 that our region is an "incredibly benign strategic environment" and it is she who blithely continued on a trip to Europe on that fateful day, still imagining she would still be entertained by European leaders while the Americans were sweeping up the dead bodies.  Many in the New Zealand intelligentsia think we can keep dumping on Australia and the US indefinitely and that no price will ever be paid for our smug moralising. Our self-congratulatory idealism has blinded us to the serious dangers our present and former allies face. It is they, after all, who have witnessed the massacre of hundreds and thousands of their citizens.  If we are ever in immediate, mortal danger, who shall we turn to for help? Canada? The United Nations? The French?  May our luck continue. Not that we deserve it. **


 * April 4 2004. New Zealand Herald. **
 * Dazzling - sure. But to what effect? **
 * [] **



media type="youtube" key="9uSzsAL4siY" height="344" width="425"
 * //Bride Flight//**(2009) First Dutch film to be set in New Zealand.

BRIDE FLIGHT. A Migration story of Dutch people arriving to New Zealand in the 1950's.

media type="youtube" key="TeoQjFm4610" width="560" height="315" In the meantime
 * //Society bites//**

and read about society culture and identity below - a University site for sociology http://www.saps.canterbury.ac.nz/
 * Sociology and Anthropology**

- Asia news http://www.ziln.co.nz/channel_detail.php?program_id=&channel_id=103

=BRIDE FLIGHT TRAILER. This a story about Dutch migrants to New Zealand in 1950= <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 10px; line-height: normal; white-space: pre;"><object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/fgUYZI9A0Lc&hl=en_US&fs=1&"> <param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"> <param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"> <embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/fgUYZI9A0Lc&hl=en_US&fs=1&" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344">

<span style="color: #e02555; font-family: 'Arial Black',Gadget,sans-serif; font-size: 120%;">This unit 10314 has a very loose back story ( with a couple of errors) to Greece and Rome in terms of the Western story-telling tradition. There is an audio wav file on transfers titled. history of film stories( ask the teacher )
 * <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 10px; line-height: normal; white-space: pre;"> - **

Some patterns of migration:

Maori arrival AD 900

Whalers and sealers from America

British migration due to NEW ZEALAND COMPANY advertising 1840 on

Chinese,American and other to the gold rushes of the 1860's

Major migration of English,Scott,Irish 1880's on

Jewish Diaspora,German and other migration 1880's

Dutch migration 1950's

Pacific Island migration 1970's

patterns now

=The economy 2010_ from the Treasury=

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 16px;">A large proportion of the risks and uncertainties around the outlook for New Zealand relate to the global economic outlook, especially around global financial <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 16px;">markets and international commodity prices. <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 16px;">If global growth continues to deteriorate and credit remains tight, businesses and households will be adversely affected. The degree to which the international situation deteriorates, and the extent <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 16px;">of the impact on the real economy, is highly uncertain at this juncture. The path taken by the exchange rate and uncertainty around oil prices are additional risks to the outlook in the current economic climate http://www.treasury.govt.nz/economy/overview/2009

__ Extended reading. __ May 3 - 3 document Stephen May 2002
 * Accommodating multiculturalism and biculturalism in Aotearoa/New Zealand **

<span style="font-family: 'Arial Black',Gadget,sans-serif;">Introduction: changing times In the last 10-15 years, we have seen a marked change in the demographic composition of Aotearoa/New Zealand, with an attendant marked increase in ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity. From a country that could still be described in 1990 as one of the most linguistically homogeneous in the world, with over 9 out of 10 of its then total population of 3.5 million people identifying as first language speakers of English (Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Mäori, 1995), we now see a significantly different picture emerging.

For example, in the 2001 census, 526,000, or 15% per cent of the population identified as having some Mäori ancestry, In addition, 232,000 people, 1 in 16 of the total population, identified themselves as Pasifika, nearly half of whom (115,000) were Samoan. Moreover, 6 out of 10 of these Pasifika peoples are New Zealand-born – that is, they are now second or third generation migrants (Statistics NZ, 2002a). Meanwhile, it is projected that the Asian population in New Zealand, which has for the first time overtaken the Pasifika population, will rise from its current numbers of approximately 240,000 to 370,000 by 2016 – an estimated 9% of the total New Zealand population (Statistics NZ 2002b).

The change in these wider population patterns has also resulted in significant changes to the presence of languages other than English and Mäori in New Zealand, as well as to the numbers of speakers who do not speak English as a first language. In the 2001 census, 160,000 identified as Mäori speakers, although the recent National Mäori Language Survey, also conducted in 2001, suggests that there are only as few as 22,000 highly fluent Mäori speakers, many of whom (73%) are 45 years of age or older, with a further 22,000 with medium fluency levels (Te Puni Kökiri, 2001).

Census projections in relation to other languages suggest that there are now over 100,000 speakers of Pasifika languages (80,000 of whom speak Samoan), approximately 95,000 speakers of the various Chinese languages, 50,000 speakers of languages from the Indian subcontinent, 20,000 speakers of Japanese, and 15,000 speakers of Korean, not to mention the 27,000 users of NZ Sign Language (Statistics NZ 2002c).

New Zealand may have taken longer than most to reflect the world-wide increase in socio-demographic diversity within nation-states – the result, in turn, of a postcolonial history dominated by migration from Britain and other English-speaking countries (see Fleras and Spoonley, 1999; Pearson, 2000) – but it is now broadly typical of most other nation-states in this respect, particularly other ex-colonial white settler colonies such as the USA, Canada, and Australia.

The challenge of multiculturalism What also typifies it however, along with many other nation-states, is a basic unwillingness to accommodate this increased demographic diversity by any significant form of commensurate institutional recognition of the languages and cultures of these minority groups.[i] Nation-states may well be increasingly diverse but institutional policies and practices are not. This disjuncture raises the thorny question of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is concerned with the social and political claims of minority groups in modern nation-states. Such groups have become increasingly sceptical of the long-held assimilationist expectation to renounce their ancestral languages and cultures as a condition of national citizenship, arguing that the latter is not dependent on the former. Indeed, minority groups are increasingly arguing for greater public recognition and representation in the public or civic realm of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and/or religious identities.[ii] As nation-states become increasingly multiethnic, the claims of minority groups for public and institutional recognition are likewise likely to increase further.

Not surprisingly, such claims are highly contentious. Many conservatives and liberals oppose and/or disavow multiculturalism as a potentially divisive, regressive movement (see, for example, Schlesinger, 1992; Barry, 2000). This response accords with a long tradition of opposition to group-based minority rights within modern nation-states (see below). The controversy surrounding multiculturalism can be usefully couched in terms of what Brian Bullivant (1981) has called ‘the pluralist dilemma’. The pluralist dilemma, for Bullivant, is ‘the problem of reconciling the diverse political claims of constituent groups and individuals in a pluralist society with the claims of the nation-state as a whole’ (1981: x); what he elsewhere describes as the competing aims of ‘civism’ and ‘pluralism’. Or, to put it another way, the pluralist dilemma requires a complex balancing act between two countervailing pressures – the need to maintain social cohesion on the one hand with, on the other, a responsibility to recognize and incorporate ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity within the nation-state.

Historically, two contrasting approaches have been adopted in response to the pluralist dilemma which Gordon (1978, 1981) has described as ‘liberal pluralism’ and ‘corporate pluralism’. Liberal pluralism is characterized by the absence, even prohibition, of any ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority group possessing separate standing before the law or government. Its central tenets can be traced back to the French Revolution and Rousseau’s conception of the modern polity as comprising three inseparable features: freedom (non-domination), the absence of differentiated roles, and a very tight common purpose. On this view, the margin for recognizing difference within the modern nation-state is very small (Taylor, 1994). Corporate pluralism (aka multiculturalism) involves, in contrast, the recognition of minority groups as legally constituted entities, on the basis of which, and depending on their size and influence, economic, social and political awards are allocated. Glazer (1975) and Walzer (1992, 1994) draw similar distinctions between an approach based on ‘non discrimination’ – which involves, in Glazer’s memorable phrase, the ‘salutary neglect’ by the state of ethnic minorities – and a ‘corporatist’ (Walzer) or ‘group rights’ (Glazer) model.

It is clear, however, that for most conservative and liberal commentators the merits of liberal pluralism significantly outweigh those of a group-rights or multiculturalist approach. In effect, the answer to the pluralist dilemma has been consistently to favour civism over pluralism.[iii] On this basis, the ‘claims of the nation-state as a whole’ – emphasising the apparently inextricable interconnections between social cohesion and national homogeneity – have invariably won the day over more pluralist conceptions of the nation-state where ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences between different groups are accorded some degree of formal recognition. This is because, in the view of such commentators, only the current organization of nation-states – represented most clearly by the neutrality of the civic realm and by the allied principle of cultural and linguistic homogeneity – can ensure personal autonomy, equality, and common citizenship (at least in theory).

In contrast, multiculturalism is accused of replacing universalism with particularism and introducing ethnicity unnecessarily and unhelpfully into the civic realm – that is, ‘civil society’ in Gramsci’s (1971) sense of the term. ** [iv] ** Where countenanced at all, alternative ethnic affiliations should be restricted solely to the private domain since the formal recognition of collective (ethnic) identity is viewed as undermining personal and political autonomy, and fostering social and political fragmentation. As Will Kymlicka observes, ‘the near-universal response of [conservatives and] liberals has been one of active hostility to [multiculturalism] ... schemes which single out minority cultures for special measures ... appear irremediably unjust, a disguise for creating or maintaining ... ethnic privilege’ (1989: 4). Any deviation from the strict principles of universal political citizenship and individual rights is seen as the first step down the road to ‘apartheid’. We see these arguments in Aotearoa/New Zealand exemplified most clearly in the right and centre right’s consistent antagonism towards differentiated rights for Mäori, as well as for other minority groups, most notably in the political slogan ‘one standard of citizenship for all’.[v]

Biculturalism versus multiculturalism
Needless to say, the antagonism towards differentiated or group-based minority rights, as a form of distinct or separate entitlement, is not limited to Aotearoa/New Zealand – it remains a prominent and ongoing feature of academic and political debate around the world (for further discussion and critique of this position, see Kymlicka, 1995a; May 2002a). However, a feature that is more distinctive to Aotearoa/New Zealand is the additional division regularly drawn between biculturalism and multiculturalism. That is, it is not only liberals and conservatives who oppose the politics of multiculturalism, but also many Mäori, concerned that the acknowledgement of group-based rights for, or recognition of, migrant groups might undermine prior bicultural commitments to Mäori under the Treaty of Waitangi.

This scepticism among Mäori towards the politics of multiculturalism is clearly illustrated by the attempts in the 1980s to instigate a multicultural curriculum in schools via the notion of ‘taha Mäori’ (Department of Education, 1984a). The promotion of taha Mäori was vociferously opposed by Mäori educationalists at the time (see, for example, Irwin, 1989; Smith, 1990), resulting in the eventual abandonment of the policy.[vi] The key point of concern here was the potential relegation of Mäori to the status of a single group among many (albeit a large and influential one), via an advocacy of multiculturalism. As Richard Benton argues, this was seen to disadvantage Mäori specifically because: it denies Mäori people their equality as members of one among two (sets of) peoples, and it also tends to deny the divisions of Maoridom their separate status while exaggerating the status of other immigrant groups. In the end, Mäori interests become peripheral, combined with other ‘special problem’ areas. (Benton, 1988: 77) The Waitangi Tribunal is equally clear on this point: We do not accept that the Mäori is just another one of a number of ethnic groups in our community. It must be remembered that of all minority groups the Mäori alone is party to a solemn treaty made with the Crown. None of the other migrant groups who have come to live in this country in recent years can claim the rights that were given to the Mäori people by the Treaty of Waitangi. Because of the Treaty Mäori New Zealanders stand on a special footing reinforcing, if reinforcement be needed, their historical position as the original inhabitants, the tangata whenua of New Zealand… (1986: 37)

Given that one of the specific aims outlined in the then Department of Education’s multicultural education policy (Department of Education 1984a) was to use biculturalism as a stepping stone to the achievement of wider multiculturalism, rather than as seeing it as distinct in itself, this scepticism about multiculturalism seems well founded.[vii] This position was also reinforced by an awareness that support for multiculturalism amongst some Päkehä arose less out of a valuing of diversity, and/or a concern for the interests of minority groups, than from a fear of the possible fulfilment of Mäori bicultural aspirations (Simon, 1989). In short, Mäori educationalists argued that if you cannot meaningfully address bicultural commitments within education, then advocacy of multiculturalism amounts to little more than meaningless rhetoric. Indeed, multiculturalism was seen as a useful ideology for containing the conflicts of ethnic groups within existing social relations rather than as the basis for any real power-sharing between Mäori and Päkehä and, from that basis, other ethnic groups.[viii]

This clearly observable tension between biculturalism and multiculturalism is not easily resolved, or resolvable, not least because the crucial issue for Mäori, and for indigenous peoples more broadly, is one of differing entitlement. As an indigenous people, Mäori argue that they have a distinct, and greater claim, to representation in the public realm than do migrant minority groups. In this light, how can the apparently competing claims of biculturalism and multiculturalism be reconciled?

Differentiating minority rights National and ethnic minorities One potential way forward here is via the widely accepted differentiation in political theory, and within international law, between two broad types of minority groups – national minorities (including indigenous peoples) and ethnic minorities – along with a related differentiation of the minority rights available to each. Drawing principally on the highly influential work of the political theorist Will Kymlicka (1989, 1995a, 1995b; see also Kymlicka and Norman, 1999), these two broad groupings can be distinguished as follows:

National minorities are minority groups that have always been associated historically with a particular territory, but have been subject to colonisation, conquest, or confederation and, consequently, now have only minority status within a particular nation-state. These groups include for example the Welsh in Britain, Catalans and Basques in Spain, Bretons in France, Québécois in Canada, and some Hispanic groups in the USA, to name but a few. They also include, crucially, indigenous peoples, who have increasingly been regarded in both international and national law as a separate category of peoples (see Thornberry, 1991, 2002; Anaya, 1996; Ivison et al, 2000). The key distinction for Kymlicka is that national minorities, at the time of their incorporation, constituted an ongoing ‘societal culture’ – that is, ‘a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities ... [and] encompassing both public and private spheres’ (1995a: 76).

Ethnic minorities are minority groups who have migrated from their country of origin to a new host nation-state, or in the case of refugees have been the subject of forced relocation (cf. Castles 2000). Consequently, ethnic minorities may well wish to maintain aspects of their cultural and linguistic identities within the host nation-state, but this is principally in order to contribute to, and modify the existing national culture rather than to recreate a separate societal culture of their own. Multinational and polyethnic (multicultural) right The distinction between the respective positions of national and ethnic minorities in modern nation-states can be further illustrated by the terms ‘multinational’ and ‘polyethnic’. As Kymlicka observes of this, most states are actually a combination of the both: ‘obviously, a single country may be both multinational (as a result of the colonising, conquest, or confederation of national minorities) and polyethnic (as a result of individual and familial immigration)’ (1995a: 17). However, most countries are also reluctant, more often than not, to acknowledge this combination in their public policy. Thus, in so-called ‘immigration societies’, such as the USA, Canada and Australia, there is recognition of these countries’ polyethnicity, but an unwillingness to distinguish and accept the rights of national minorities such as Native Americans, Hawaiians and Puerto Ricans in the US context, Native Canadians and Québécois in Canada, and Australian Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders in Australia. In some European states, however, the reverse applies, where the rights of national minorities (in Belgium and Switzerland for example) have long been recognised but an accommodation of immigrants and a more polyethnic society has been far less forthcoming. Recognising both dimensions, and the respective rights attendant upon them, is the central challenge for developing a more plurally conceived approach to public policy in modern nation-states. In this respect, Kymlicka argues that in addition to the civil rights available to all individuals, national minority groups can lay claim to what he terms ‘self-government rights’ and ethnic minorities to ‘polyethnic rights’ (see 1995a: 26-33).

Self-government rights acknowledge that the nation-state is not the sole preserve of the majority (national) group and that legitimate national minorities have the right to equivalent inclusion and representation in the public domain. Accordingly, national minorities should be provided with rights to their autonomy and self-determination within the nation-state, including the retention and representation of their language and culture where they so choose.[ix] This clearly accords in the New Zealand context to the notion of tino rangatiratanga for Mäori, and to the state’s bicultural commitments to Mäori under the Treaty of Waitangi, including here the retention and promotion of te reo me öna tikanga Mäori within education and the wider public domain. The key in providing for such rights is their permanent status. They are not seen as a temporary measure or remedy that may one day be revoked (cf. Waitangi Tribunal, 1986; Hastings, 1988; Durie, 1998) Polyethnic rights also challenge the hegemonic construction of the nation-state but for a different clientele and to different ends. Polyethnic rights are intended to help ethnic minority groups to continue to express their cultural, linguistic and/or religious heritage, principally in the private domain, without it hampering their success within the economic and political institutions of the dominant national society. Like self-government rights, polyethnic rights are thus also seen as permanent, since they seek to protect rather than eliminate cultural and linguistic differences. However, their principal purpose is to promote integration into the larger society (and to contribute to and modify that society as a result) rather than to foster self-governing status among such groups. In this regard, integration comes to be seen as a reciprocal process rather than a simple accommodation of ethnic minority groups to the majoritarian national culture.

Taken together, these two kinds of rights can be regarded as distinct but not necessarily mutually exclusive.[x] Employing this distinction thus allows us – theoretically at least – to overcome the potential impasse between biculturalism and multiculturalism in Aotearoa/New Zealand. But how might it actually be operationalised? The issue of minority language rights, and the related provision of minority language education, provides us with a useful example.

Language rights

With respect to language rights, we can make a broad distinction between two types of rights: tolerance-oriented rights and promotion-oriented rights (Kloss, 1971, 1977; see also Macías, 1979).[xi] Tolerance-oriented rights ensure the right to preserve one’s first language in the private, non-governmental sphere of national life – the family, church, cultural organisations and private schools, for example. The key principle of such rights is that the state does ‘not interfere with efforts on the parts of the minority to make use of [their language] in the private domain’ (Kloss, 1977: 2). Under general principles of international law, and human rights, it is clear that all minority groups should be accorded these rights (see Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000). The issues become more complicated though in relation to promotion-oriented language rights which regulate the extent to which minority rights are recognised within the public domain – that is, the additional recognition of public, or institutionalised language rights. As such, promotion-oriented language rights involve ‘public authorities [in] trying to promote a minority [language] by having it used in public institutions – legislative, administrative and educational, including the public schools’ (1977: 2).[xii] Taking the realm of education as an example, promotion-oriented language rights thus raise the inevitable question about what obligation, if any, the state has to promote or foster minority languages within state schools? And if the state does become involved in this, how can it set reasonable limits on who might be eligible for such language education? This is where the national and ethnic minority distinction can apply. In other words, the state has a historical and territorial obligation towards national minorities, including indigenous peoples, to provide such language education as of right since such groups have always been associated with those particular territories. This principle is increasingly being adopted worldwide – Norway has provided this right for its indigenous Sámi people in the Northern Province of Finnmark, Canada for its Inuit peoples in the new province of Nunavut, and for the Québécois in Quebec. Catalonia and Wales have likewise enshrined the provision of Catalan and Welsh medium education respectively, in law (see May 2001 for further discussion). It is somewhat more complicated for ethnic minorities, but there is a principle in international law that can be usefully applied here as well and that is the criterion ‘where numbers warrant’. In short, there is an increasing recognition within international law that significant minorities within a nation-state have a reasonable expectation to some form of state support, including educational provision in their first language (de Varennes, 1996). In other words, while it would be unreasonable (and impractical) for nation-states to be required to fund language and education services for all minorities (cf. Carens, 2000; May 2003), it is increasingly accepted that where a language is spoken by a significant number within the nation-state, it would also be unreasonable not to provide some level of state services and activity in that language ‘where numbers warrant’.[xiii] As the political theorist, Joseph Carens observes of this in relation to Canada, ‘to require the minority group to have its public services delivered and its children educated in the language of the majority would be rightly perceived as a form of majority tyranny, a blatant disregard for the interests of the minority in a context where those interests could be taken into account with comparatively little cost to the majority’ (2000: 83). Accordingly, Canada has adopted the criterion of ‘where numbers warrant’ in relation to French speakers outside of Québec, via the (1982) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, while a similar approach is adopted in Finland with respect to first language Swedish speakers living there. India provides perhaps the best example of this principle in operation since the Constitution of India (Article 350A) directs every state, and every local authority within that state, to provide ‘adequate’ educational facilities for instruction in the first language of linguistic minorities where such numbers warrant, at least at primary school level. South Africa’s establishment in 1994 of formal multilingualism in 11 state languages also has the potential to follow the Indian model in the provision of minority language education along these lines Implications for Aotearoa/New Zealand The implications of such an approach for the ongoing development of public policy in Aotearoa/New Zealand, particularly in relation to language and education, could be as follows.

1. Mäori as an indigenous people or national minority In Aotearoa/New Zealand there have been significant advances in the last 20 years concerning the revived status of te reo Mäori - particularly within, but not limited to, education. The 1986 decision of the Waitangi Tribunal to include te reo Mäori as a ‘taonga’ under the Treaty’s auspices, allied with the implementation of the 1987 Mäori Language Act, have accorded te reo Mäori for the first time since colonisation with official language status within Aotearoa/New Zealand. Indeed, this stands as one of the only examples currently in the world where the first language of an indigenous people has been recognised as a state language. While there are other forms of indigenous language recognition – for example, in relation to Sámi in Finnmark and Inuktitut in Nunavut – these are all at the regional level Meanwhile, we have seen the (re)emergence,[xiv] and subsequent rapid expansion, of Mäori-medium education in Aotearoa/New Zealand, beginning most notably with the establishment of the first Köhanga Reo Mäori-medium preschool in 1982. The significance and impact of these developments have been such that by 1996, at its high point, there were 767 köhanga catering for over 14,000 Mäori children (Ministry of Education, 1998). Although there has been some decline in numbers since then, there were still 9,500 Mäori students (approx. 30% of all Mäori preschool enrolments) enrolled in 560 köhanga in 2001. This expansion has also had a ‘domino effect’ throughout the education system, as köhanga graduates have worked their way through the school system over the course of the last twenty years. This is particularly evident at the primary level with the emergence of the first (privately funded) Kura Kaupapa Mäori (literally, Mäori philosophy school) in 1985. In 1990, 6 Kura Kaupapa Mäori were approved for state funding and by 1999, 59 Kura Kaupapa Mäori had been established, serving approximately 4,000 students (Ministry of Education, 1998). These developments are also now beginning to extend to higher educational levels with the establishment in 1993/1994 of the first Wharekura (Mäori-medium secondary schools) and Whare Wänanga (tertiary institutions). By 1997 there were four such Wharekura and three Wänanga. But there are also significant limits to these developments. The Language Act does not extend the right to use or to demand the use of Mäori in the public domain beyond the oral use of the language in Courts of law and some quasi-legal Tribunals (Benton, 1988). Similarly, while the rise of Mäori language medium education has been spectacular, it still constitutes only a small percentage of the overall state provision of education in Aotearoa/New Zealand, even to Mäori students, let alone all (Bishop and Glynn, 1999; May, 2002b).[xv] There is, thus, a very strong argument, given the rights of Mäori as an indigenous people or national minority within international law, to the continued further support and expansion of these developments by the state – that is, to the ongoing primacy of biculturalism within Aotearoa/New Zealand generally, and the expansion of Mäori-medium language education (and other forms of bilingual education) in particular. This is based on the rights of a national minority to maintain their language and culture in the same way that majority national groups are able to maintain theirs’ since, as Will Kymlicka observes: leaving one’s culture [and language], while possible, is best seen as renouncing something to which one is reasonably entitled’ (1995a: 90). Biculturalism can thus be described by another term employed by Kymlicka – as a form of ‘external protection’. What external protections presuppose is the opportunity and right of national minority groups, including indigenous peoples, to seek to protect their distinct identity by limiting the impact of the decisions of the larger society. External protections are thus intended to ensure that individual members are able to maintain a distinctive way of life if they so choose and are not prevented from doing so by the decisions of members outside of their community (see Kymlicka, 1995a: 204. n.11), particularly when the latter are in the numerical majority, as is (now) the case with Päkehä in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The historical fact that a distinct Mäori identity, language, and culture originate only in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and that should they be lost, they will be lost to the world, add significant further weight to this right to external protection. Ethnic minorities, in contrast, tend still to have their language(s) spoken in their ancestral homelands. Relatedly, indigenous languages such as Mäori are also often the languages most at risk in terms of language shift and loss, the result in turn of often-extreme coercive historical processes of assimilation, linguistic proscription and wider social, political and economic marginalization (Tully, 1995; May, 2001).

2. Ethnic minority groups in Aotearoa/New Zealand But what of ethnic minority groups in Aotearoa/New Zealand – where do they stand in all this? Can they be accorded multicultural (or polyethnic) rights which allow for the greater recognition and maintenance of their first languages and cultures in such a way as not to undermine prior (and pre-eminent) bicultural commitments to Mäori? On the basis of the earlier distinction drawn between multinational and polyethnic (or multicultural) rights, I believe they can. That said, we have a considerable way to go in even addressing this issue, let alone accomplishing it, since such groups in Aotearoa/New Zealand – notably Pasifika and Asian migrants, and refugees – have barely been accorded any distinct minority rights thus far at all. For example, at present, the language and education provision for such groups in their first languages remains extremely limited, the result largely of the predominance of English in Aotearoa/New Zealand and, the re-emergence of Mäori aside, the ongoing valorisation of English as both the pre-eminent national and international language (cf. Phillipson, 1992; Pennycook, 1994, 1998: Holborow, 1999). A more accommodative viewpoint has been advanced in recent years, recognising a responsibility (and need) for more active state support of the first languages of other ethnic minority groups, particularly within education. Thus, the Ministry of Education has since the mid-1990s begun to look more seriously at the maintenance of Pasifika languages within Aotearoa/New Zealand, and is currently in the process of belatedly, but actively, exploring the issues and possibilities around Pasifika bilingual education. This is in accord with their earlier assurance that ‘students whose mother tongue is a Pacific Islands language or a community language will have the opportunity to develop and use their own language as an integral part of their schooling’ (1993: 10). However, these developments have not as yet move much beyond the rhetorical and/or gestural.

One way that they might move beyond the realm of rhetoric is by employing the approach adopted in Mäori-medium education as a template for further developments in Pasifika bilingual education. Indeed, this is beginning to happen, as seen for example in the nascent emergence of comparable Pasifika preschool language nests (modelled on Te Köhanga Reo),[xvi] and, more recently, a limited number of Pasifika bilingual primary programmes (McCaffery et al, 2003). At the very least, such developments indicate that the promotion of Mäori-medium education need not be at the expense of other ethnic minority groups in Aotearoa/New Zealand and, crucially, vice versa – that prior bicultural commitments should not be seen as problematic in relation to multiculturalism, because they involve fundamentally different entitlements. Indeed, such developments may well be instrumental in facilitating the latter’s expansion along comparable lines, albeit not on the same basis of entitlement, given the specific status of Mäori as an indigenous people. And this brings me to my final point – what should the basis of entitlement be for migrant ethnic groups in this respect? Quite simply, and drawing on the earlier discussion of international law, ‘where numbers warrant’. Given the statistics outlined at the beginning of this chapter – both concerning the increasing numbers of ethnic minorities in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and the related increase in the number of first language speakers other than English and Mäori – this is an important criterion of minority rights and language rights that Aotearoa/New Zealand needs to begin to address much more seriously than it has hitherto.

Conclusion** https://youtu.be/jHMDThqWRgs

The arguments in this chapter can be summarised simply as follows. Early attempts to promote multiculturalism, principally via education, //were// clearly problematic and were rightly discarded for their potential to undermine prior and pre-eminent bicultural commitments to Mäori as tangata whenua. Likewise, any attempt to reinstigate multiculturalism as public policy must continue to address this concern directly and centrally. However, the discussion of language rights and language education demonstrates that there is potential at least for accommodating both biculturalism and multiculturalism within Aotearoa/New Zealand, albeit still not easily.

What this chapter has not addressed, however, is the ongoing wider opposition to //any// form of differential entitlement – bicultural //or// multicultural – within Aotearoa/New Zealand. Ongoing political and policy controversy, particularly with respect to the legitimacy of separate Mäori entitlements, suggests that Aotearoa/New Zealand, like many other nation-states, still has a considerable way to go in moving, in Bullivant’s (1981) terminology, from ‘civism’ to ‘pluralism’. Whether it is actually able to do so still remains to be seen.

References

[i] I use the term ‘minority’ throughout this chapter to describe groups that have less power, rights and privileges than ‘majority’ groups. This is consonant with the use of this term in political theory and within international law. [ii] A particular problem that one soon encounters in any discussion of multiculturalism, and the various minority groups who lay claim to it, is the sheer diversity of so called ‘multiculturalist’ claims. Thus, while ethnicity and culture are most often, and perhaps most prominently, associated with multiculturalist demands, they are by no means exclusively so. Religious, gender and other special representation rights also often come under the rubric, loosely defined, of multiculturalism. It is not possible to pursue this issue further here, except to say that in what follows I will concentrate primarily on ethnicity and culture, since these remain the principal locus of multiculturalism. For a useful analysis of the various demands that are associated with multiculturalism, their legitimacy, and their limits, see Kymlicka (1995a) and Parekh (2000). [iii] This is certainly the position of Gordon and Glazer in their respective analyses of the two approaches (see also Glazer, 1997), although Walzer adopts a more sympathetic stance towards pluralism. [iv] As Gramsci argues, in order to understand any nation-state as a whole, one must always distinguish between its ‘State’ or political and administrative structure, and its ‘civil society’. The latter comprises, for example, its principal non-political organizations, its religious and other beliefs, and its specific ‘customs’ or way of life. In making these distinctions, there are inevitably features which do not fit easily under either category. However, as Nairn summarizes its: ‘that is relatively unimportant. What matters is that they are distinguishable, and that the singular identity of a modern society depends upon the relationship between them’ (1981: 131). [v] More extreme examples of this position can be seen in the politics of the English Only movement in the USA, which specifically opposes linguistic rights for Spanish-speaking Hispanic Americans (see May, 2001, 2003 for further discussion). Closer to home, we have the erstwhile Australian politician, Pauline Hanson, and her far-right ‘One Nation’ party, with its overtly anti-Aboriginal and anti-Asian politics. [vi] This has meant that multicultural education – though widespread elsewhere, particularly in the USA (Sleeter, 1996, 2001; Nieto, 2000) – has not been actively or consistently pursued in New Zealand since the 1980s, in theory, policy, or practice, except at localised school level. However, the changing socio-demographic patterns of recent times have led to the question of multicultural education once again being raised as a possible policy option (see May, 2002b). [vii] As a related publication states: “an effective approach to multicultural education is //through// bicultural education” (Department of Education, 1984b, 31; my emphasis). [viii] Relatedly, multicultural education was criticised extensively for its tendency towards ‘superficial culturalism’ – that is, a focus on ‘cultural difference’ at the specific expense of addressing wider, systemic issues of inequality faced by minority groups, such as racism, discrimination, and material disadvantage (see May, 1994, 1999, 2002a, 2002b for further discussion). [ix] In this sense, self-government rights are not principally, or even necessarily associated with secession, as the term ‘self-government’ often implies. The central principle is that national minorities have the right to greater //autonomy// or control of their own affairs within the nation-state. [x] Kymlicka also discusses a third right – ‘special representation rights’ – available to groups that have been discriminated on the grounds of, for example, gender or sexuality. However, these rights are only temporary – once the discrimination has been redressed, the right no longer applies. [xi] Macías distinguishes between two broadly comparable sets of rights: the right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of language, and the right to use your language(s) in the activities of communal life (1979: 88-89). [xii] Such rights may be narrowly or widely applied. At their narrowest, promotion-oriented rights might simply involve the publishing of public documents in minority languages. At their broadest, promotion-oriented rights could involve recognition of a minority language in all formal domains within the nation-state, thus allowing the minority language group ‘to care for its internal affairs through its own public organs, which amounts to the [state] allowing self government for the minority group’ (Kloss, 1977: 24). [xiii] This also accords with the wider principle in international law – formulated by UNESCO in 1953 – that, where possible, a child should have the right to be educated in their first language. [xiv] Mäori-medium education was prominent in the early years of colonization. Early mission schools, while they taught only the standard subjects of the English school curriculum, did so through the medium of Mäori. As a result, the period in which these schools were most influential – 1816 to the mid 1840s – saw a rapid spread of literacy among Mäori // in both //Mäori // and English //. However, the (1847) Education Ordinance Act made ongoing state funding of mission schools dependent on English being the medium of instruction, effectively ending this early practice of Mäori -medium teaching (see May, 2001: Chapter 7). [xv] In 1996, for example, only 2.3 per cent of Maori school students were enrolled in a kura; the vast majority remain in the mainstream, predominantly monolingual education system (Ministry of Education, 1998) [xvi] In 1993, 177 such language nests, catering for 3877 children, were receiving government funding (Benton, 1996).

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